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This issue of Essays in Philosophy is, as far as I know, the first extended effort to look at the 
theoretical structures of public philosophy. It is therefore, idiosyncratic and diverse in its 
approaches. There are times when the authors speak with tentative caution and others when 
they proclaim with loud and certain voices. In other words, they are all philosophers 
engaged in philosophical inquiry, a fact that, surprisingly, the vicissitudes of professional 
life require that I underscore.  
 
The relevant call for papers defined public philosophy as “doing philosophy with general 
audiences in a non-academic setting,” adding that “while it is often said to play a role in 
democratic education, public philosophy is its own enterprise. It is philosophy outside the 
classroom, a voluntary endeavor without course-credit, assignments, or even a clear 
purpose.” As broad as it is, this description hides the fact that many consider the very name 
“public philosophy” to be an oxymoron. It is said that only philosophers can do philosophy 
and that the most that the general public can be are students. Furthermore, whatever a 
philosopher chooses to do with his or her time, public philosophy should not count as 
research. It might be teaching, it might even be service, but it is most definitely not 
scholarship, or so many pre-tenured philosophers are told.  
 
Critiques of public philosophy tend to revolve around two objections. The first is that public 
philosophy is not disciplined enough. Because it addresses non-specialists, the argument 
concludes, it does not have the precision or extended nature of true philosophical inquiry. 
Audiences are usually unaware of the philosophical literature that preceded their discussion 
and, as a result, old ground is retrodden, and no new knowledge is created. Responding to 
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this objection is always the subtext and often the supertext of the articles in this issue. I shall 
defer my rebuttal to the contributors. 
 
The second major objection is that public philosophy is just bad philosophy. This is the 
critique of the philosophy blogosphere, the essence of the complaints and jabs from 
professors who have embraced the “snarky” ethos of the World Wide Web. And no single 
category of public philosophy has received more of their negative attention than the 
“philosophy and popular culture” collections that dominate philosophy sections in whatever 
brick and mortar bookstores still dot the American landscape. These anthologies are the last 
refuge for scoundrels, the bloggers and their commenters tell us. They are publishing 
warehouses for the unpublishable and the creation of audiences for those with nothing worth 
saying. 
 
These blogs are ripe for Marxist if not Freudian analysis. They often read as power 
preservation rather than thoughtful contributions, and by declaring who is “in” and who is 
“out,” they seem to believe that they institutionalize their own leadership. I shall also defer 
these deconstructions; they are too “inside baseball” and, frankly, too boring to concern us 
here. Instead, I shall remark simply that no area of philosophy is reserved for purely good or 
the purely bad publication. One can only evaluate quality on a case-by-case basis. There is 
indeed bad public philosophy out there, but there is equally bad work for specialists. Some 
of the most prestigious publishers have pushed some of the most indefensible texts. 
 
Ultimately, though, the problem this critique of quality reveals is that there are, in fact, no 
established standards for public philosophy. There is no community agreement as to what 
public philosophy should look like, let alone, what criteria it ought to privilege. There isn’t 
a public philosophy canon, either. Most agree that the historical Socrates was doing some 
form of public philosophy, but the Platonic version engages the Classical Greek equivalent 
of academics at least as often as he does general audiences. Aurelius, Machiavelli, Astor, 
Mandeville, Montaigne, Wollstonecraft, Dewey, Rand, and Russell are but a few other 
candidates for public philosophy canonization, but each of them had academic or 
professional motives as well, and such a list of prestigious practitioners suggests that public 
philosophy is just traditional philosophy with a different rhetorical slant. 
 
This concern, identifying the standards and canon of public philosophy is also a 
preoccupation of the contributors to this issue. They each attempt to consider the history and 
practice of public philosophy in order to find the criteria implicit in the most successful of 
public philosophy endeavors, including, of course, the philosophy and popular culture 
anthologies. None of the authors are so unsophisticated to think that every work of public 
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philosophy is worth celebrating. Most, however, suggest that the public philosophy project 
is inherently valuable as a whole. 
 
And this philosophical analysis leads to a further complexity: the subject of this issue is 
public philosophy, but professionals will dominate its audience. There is no small amount 
of sociology underpinning these discussions and often more than a bit of hope that an essay 
can reach a wide audience of amateur philosophers who want to understand what it is they 
are doing. But they are still specialized essays about a public endeavor and this has led to 
confusion. More than one author presented essays with an informal voice, adopting the 
public philosophy technique of modeling writing on everyday conversation. In response, I, 
as editor, asked them to add formality to their work. I believed that if they did, they would 
have more chance of persuading skeptical professionals to take their academic voices more 
seriously and to think better of the ideas they communicate. My hope was and remains, that 
these readings would inspire a revaluation of public philosophy by the skeptical. 
 
In other words, given the controversial nature of the subject, this journal issue is a work of 
advocacy as well as philosophy. It attempts to suggest the legitimacy of the project, not just 
the nature. It is analogous to the many conversations that philosophers are having in Deans’ 
and Provosts’ offices around the world: in each instance apologists are asserting that their 
tasks are worthy of celebrating and, therefore, funding. By showing both the necessity and 
the sophistication of the project, the authors in this issue are declaring the value of their 
contributions. Through Essays in Philosophy, many public philosophers are coming out of 
the closet. 
 
Given the complexity and diversity of contributions, I have divided the essays into three 
groups. The first “What is public philosophy?” attempts to articulate the standards and teloi 
of the activity itself. Here the question of quality is front and center, as is the legitimacy of 
the philosophy and popular culture series. 
 
The second section “public philosophy and the profession of philosophy” considers the 
place of public philosophy in academic life. It contains articles asking whether public 
philosophy should count as teaching, research, and service, and whether professors who 
engage in these non-university activities are making legitimate contribution to the field and 
their department. One of the authors offers a spirited defense of the philosophy and popular 
culture books; another concludes that public philosophy is a moral obligation, even for 
professionals. 
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The third section contains nominations for the public philosophy canon, showing that its 
practitioners are not just public intellectuals, but diverse scholars from three disparate 
schools of thought: Christian apologetics, analytic philosophy, and pragmatism. 
 
None of the contributors are under the delusion that these essays will settle controversies 
about public philosophy, it’s criteria and canon, professional role, or history, but each hopes 
that they will spark further conversation. It should not escape notice that there are few 
citations in this issue that point to articles about public philosophy. Instead, references 
advert mostly to work from which conclusions can be teased out. This adds support to my 
earlier conviction that this is the first extended effort to look at the theoretical structures of 
public philosophy. As time moves on, however, all the authors hope that this collection will 
be referenced by those who seek to further the agenda they’ve established. Public 
philosophy, in order to survive, must be taken seriously, and to be taken seriously, it must 
cultivate a body of academic work that explores and refines the practice. This is only a 
founding collection in a new and important area of inquiry, and there is more disagreement 
than consensus among the authors. But this just means there is more room to welcome those 
who choose to respond. If this collection is quickly superseded, it means that more 
professionals have taken on the challenge of theorizing public philosophy, an outcome that 
all of the contributors would welcome.  
 
 
